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Aligning flexibility with uncertainty in software development 
arrangements through a contractual typology 
 
 
Abstract 
Purpose – The motivation for this study is to identify a typology of procurement contracts in the 
context of software development projects that allows firms to align design flexibility with design 
uncertainty at the project level. The theoretical lenses of contract theory and software engineering 
are used (i) to explain why the five archetypes in the proposed typology provide gradually 
increasing levels of design flexibility, and (ii) to develop hypotheses about the associations 
between design flexibility and a set of project cost dimensions.  
Design/methodology/approach – The hypotheses are tested with objective contractual data from 
270 software development contracts entered into by a leading international bank over a period of 
three years. 
Findings – Data analysis confirms the existence of the proposed typology and shows that design 
flexibility is negatively associated with control, and positively associated with coordination, trust, 
duration, and price. 
Research limitations/implications – Although the findings are based on the contracting 
practices of a single, albeit sophisticated, organization, they shed light on the ability of firms to 
align flexibility with uncertainty at the onset of new projects by taking advantage of nuanced 
contractual mechanisms to produce a broader set of contractual archetypes.  
Originality/value – This paper is the first in the outsourcing literature to analyze a nuanced 
contractual typology in software development projects through the perspectives of both contract 
theory and software engineering.   
 
Keywords: Outsourcing, software development, projects, contracting, flexibility, costs 
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Introduction 
Although information technology (IT) outsourcing is a mature practice, it remains a managerial 
challenge, with the fundamental issues of developing an outsourcing capability, defining the 
scope of outsourcing, and selecting an outsourcing partner as the most pressing issues (Gewald 
and Schäfer, 2017). Of the variety of IT activities, software development remains one of the most 
complex, uncertain tasks to outsource and its outsourcing continues to grow at an annual rate of 
over 10%, according to authoritative estimates (Deloitte, 2016). A major challenge in outsourced 
software development projects is bridging the gap between the frequent need to modify the 
design of the system under development and the binding nature of the contract governing the 
relationship between the parties (Goo et al., 2009; Sia et al., 2008). Custom-made software is 
often developed through a time-consuming process, during which environmental changes may 
occur and render previous development efforts ineffective (Austin and Devin, 2009). However, 
adaptations in ongoing external development efforts are not easily attained. The contractual 
nature of external development processes constrains their ability to accommodate change relative 
to development processes that are confined within organizational boundaries. When the external 
competitive environment, the internal organizational environment, or the technological 
environment changes in a manner that necessitates software design modifications, adaptability is 
constrained by the contractual rigidity of software development arrangements. 
This challenge is not unique to outsourced software development projects. Discrete resource 
acquisition through procurement projects is a common interorganizational situation. Firms rely 
on procurement projects to acquire various resources, such as building constructions (Bajari and 
Tadelis, 2001), offshore drilling (Corts and Singh, 2004), and marketing campaigns. All these 
examples represent discrete project relationships. Although such relationships may be repeated 
between the same two partners, the distinctive feature of such relationships is that a separate 
contract is negotiated and signed for each new project. This contractual nature of procurement 
projects may limit their adaptability to environmental changes.  
The motivation behind this study was thus to identify contractual mechanisms that can 
sustain the adaptability of software development arrangements. The study, therefore, had two 
objectives. The first objective was to address the gap between the various needs for business 
adaptability and the limitations of formal contracts in the practice of software engineering. 
Although the literature focuses on two types of contracts, fixed-price and time-and-materials 
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(Gopal et al., 2003), practitioners are aware of the limitations of the dichotomy (Gaebert, 2015) 
and find nuanced approaches to narrow this gap (i.e., to align flexibility with uncertainty). The 
second objective was to analyze the theoretical mechanisms underlying these nuanced 
approaches, as identified by contract theory (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005; Hart and 
Holmstrom, 1985).  
The rationale underlying our approach may be described as follows. Different procurement 
projects are associated with different levels of uncertainty about design adaptations (Bajari and 
Tadelis, 2001). Sustaining the adaptability of procurement projects requires the alignment of 
design flexibility with design uncertainty at the project level. This proposition is in line with the 
study of Anderson and Dekker (2005), who showed that misalignment between uncertainty and 
contract design is associated with performance problems. It is also in line with the findings of 
Gulati et al. (2005), who showed "that performance differences across modes of procurement 
arise as a function of the match between adaptive capacity and adaptation requirements" (p. 415). 
Because uncertainty represents a continuum (Harrington et al., 2004), i.e., it is not necessarily 
either high or low, such alignment is unlikely when firms use a very narrow set of procurement 
arrangements. Hence, firms seek to institute a variety of procurement arrangements that range 
from extremely inflexible to extremely flexible. Firms moving along the design flexibility 
continuum face two opposing incentives. On the one hand, they are motivated to move up the 
continuum to increase flexibility. On the other hand, design flexibility is associated with project 
costs and process inefficiencies (Gopal and Koka, 2010), which motivate firms to restrict it. 
Therefore, sustaining the adaptability of procurement projects is contingent upon the institution 
of a design flexibility continuum and the capacity to align design flexibility with design 
uncertainty at the onset of each new project. If such adaptability is absent, the probable 
consequence is either projects with suboptimal flexibility (when uncertainty exceeds flexibility) 
or projects with suboptimal costs (when flexibility exceeds uncertainty). 
In the context of software development arrangements (SDAs), we define design flexibility 
as the degree to which an SDA provides structural mechanisms to accommodate changes in the 
specifications of the software product. To validate the approach presented above, we examine 
two of its key assumptions in the context of SDAs. The first assumption is that firms use an 
institutionalized variety of procurement arrangements with increasing levels of design flexibility. 
The second assumption is that design flexibility is associated with project costs. These two 
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assumptions, which research has not addressed to date, are empirically tested in this study to offer 
an explanation of how adaptability is sustained in SDAs.   
To examine the two assumptions, we draw on the theoretical frameworks of contract theory 
and software engineering. Consequently, this study contributes to two streams of literature. The 
contribution of this study to the contract theory literature stems from addressing an important gap 
in this literature, that between theoretical predictions and empirical evidence. Studies have shown 
that in situations of asymmetric information (one party has information that is not available to the 
other party), characterized by a screening problem, the uninformed party screens the informed 
party by offering a menu of contracts from which the informed party selects a specific contract, 
thus revealing its private information (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005). 
However, empirical studies have not been able to confirm this normative prediction and have 
shown that menus of contracts are not used in practice (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001; Laffont and 
Tirole, 1993). The present study offers a unique interpretation of the concept of "menu of 
contracts". It aims at demonstrating that menus of contracts do indeed exist in practice to align 
the incentives of buyers and sellers, even though those incentives may be associated with 
motivations other than ex ante screening. The contribution of this study to the software 
engineering literature is the novel demonstration of the need for and the costs of facilitating the 
flexibility of software development. Research has generally addressed the need for design 
flexibility in software projects by focusing on the development methodologies. In this regard, a 
notable trend in the past decade has been the embracing of agile methodologies (Boehm, 2002; 
Dingsøyr et al., 2012; Martin, 2003), because "the traditional, plan-driven software development 
methodologies lack the flexibility to dynamically adjust the development process" (Nerur et al., 
2005, p. 73). However, in the quest for agility, software engineering research has largely 
overlooked other project governance issues, in particular those related to the interorganizational 
mechanisms underlying the development process. Against this backdrop, this study is the first to 
demonstrate the importance of client-vendor arrangements in determining software design 
flexibility as well as the consequences of such flexibility for project performance. 
The outline of this paper is as follows. The next section develops a contractual typology of 
SDAs, demonstrates why this typology represents a continuum of design flexibility, and analyzes 
the consequences of each contractual archetype for different project cost dimensions. The third 
section builds on this theoretical framework to formulate a set of hypotheses about the 
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associations between design flexibility and cost dimensions. The fourth section describes the 
research methodology used in this study to collect objective contractual data from 270 software 
development contracts made by a leading international bank over a period of three years. The 
fifth section describes the data analysis techniques used in this study to test the hypotheses and 
the results obtained. Finally, the last section discusses the findings and their implications. 
 
Theoretical framework: A contractual typology 
We define an SDA as a contractual arrangement that involves the development of full or partial 
custom-made software by external vendors. In SDAs, software development activities are 
managed by the vendor and performed outside the client's premises. This definition differentiates 
SDAs from other forms of software-related outsourcing; contracting for consulting services or 
"body leasing" is typical of projects managed by the client, and contracting for licensing of off-
the-shelf software usually does not involve significant software development (although it may 
involve software customization by the client). Procurement arrangements in general have been 
classified into two archetypes – fixed-price and cost-plus (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001). SDAs have 
similarly been classified as either fixed-price (FP) or time-and-materials (T&M) (Banerjee and 
Duflo, 2000; Gopal et al., 2003; Lichtenstein, 2004; Schermann et al., 2016; Whang, 1992). With 
FP contracts, the price for completing the project is predetermined. Conversely, T&M contracts 
do not specify a price, but rather reimburse the vendor for its costs plus a predetermined profit. 
While contract theory suggests that contract diversification is the consequence of adverse 
selection problems, Bajari and Tadelis (2001) argue that different types of contracts are needed 
because of the importance of ex post adaptation, i.e., design changes that are required after the 
contract has been signed. They note that "the procurement problem is primarily one of ex post 
adaptations rather than ex ante screening" (Bajari and Tadelis, 2001, p. 388). Projects with high 
levels of design completeness (i.e., adaptations are not likely to be needed) are procured using FP 
contracts, whereas projects with low levels of design completeness are procured using T&M 
contracts. Therefore, ex ante design completeness is related to ex post design flexibility (Tadelis, 
2002). Design flexibility has been recognized in the management literature as a central concept in 
new product development under uncertainty (Krishnan and Bhattacharya, 2002). 
Formal models show that "the optimal contract is always either a fixed-price or a time and 
materials contract" (Banerjee and Duflo, 2000, p. 996). However, these two contractual 
Page 5 of 38 Strategic Outsourcing: an International Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Strategic Outsourcing: an International Journal
6 
archetypes offer a very limited choice between the extremely low design flexibility of FP 
contracts and the extremely high design flexibility of T&M contracts. We argue that such a 
narrow set of procurement arrangements cannot provide the continuum of design flexibility 
necessary to align design flexibility with design uncertainty at the project level. On the one hand, 
firms that opt for FP contracts are locked into inflexible arrangements that increase the likelihood 
of suboptimal flexibility, whereas, on the other hand, firms that opt for T&M contracts benefit 
from flexible arrangements that increase the likelihood of suboptimal costs. We thus posit that 
adaptability in contracting for software development requires a broader variety of SDAs with 
gradually increasing levels of design flexibility. 
Our conceptual analysis develops a novel typology of five contractual archetypes (Fink et 
al., 2013). We begin with the traditional distinction between FP and T&M contracts and rely on 
two assumptions to combine and separate these two prevailing archetypes into five new 
archetypes. The first assumption is that a continuum of design flexibility requires that FP and 
T&M contracts should not remain mutually exclusive. This assumption leads to the definition of 
an archetype that is based on a relatively balanced combination of FP and T&M arrangements – 
the Mixed archetype. This archetype allows both low and high levels of design flexibility to 
coexist within a single contract and thus affords an intermediate level of design flexibility. The 
second assumption is that a continuum of design flexibility requires more variance at its low and 
high ends, which can be achieved by defining archetypal variations of FP and T&M contracts. 
We define two archetypal variations of FP contracts and two archetypal variations of T&M 
contracts by drawing on contracting techniques described in the literature. We focus on a single 
technique for each class of archetypes (FP or T&M) so as to maintain the relative simplicity of 
the typology. The criterion for identifying the most relevant technique for each class of 
archetypes is the ability of the technique to moderate the extreme level of design flexibility 
characterizing the class. The most relevant technique for FP contracts is the change provision, 
which is a specific contractual clause with explicit change management principles and guidelines. 
The change provision is most relevant for FP contracts, because it addresses the need to introduce 
design changes, which is the major risk associated with the low design flexibility of these 
contracts. Consequently, we define two archetypal variations of FP contracts, FP contracts 
without a change provision and FP contracts with a change provision, where the latter is 
characterized by higher design flexibility than the former. The most relevant technique for T&M 
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contracts is the price cap, which is a predetermined maximum price specified in the contract 
(Kalnins and Mayer, 2004). The price cap is most relevant for T&M contracts, because it 
addresses price escalation, which is the major risk associated with the high design flexibility of 
these contracts. Consequently, we define two archetypal variations of T&M contracts, T&M 
contracts without a price cap and T&M contracts with a price cap, where the latter is 
characterized by lower design flexibility than the former. This conceptual analysis produces the 
following contractual typology, which represents a continuum of design flexibility1:  
Archetype 1: FP contracts without a change provision (FP-w/o-change) 
Archetype 2: FP contracts with a change provision (FP-w/-change) 
Archetype 3: Mixed FP and T&M contracts (Mixed) 
Archetype 4: T&M contracts with a price cap (T&M-w/-cap) 
Archetype 5: T&M contracts without a price cap (T&M-w/o-cap) 
We employ two theoretical perspectives, software engineering and contract theory, to 
identify the implications of using each contractual archetype in SDAs. Software engineering 
represents the actual craft through which the resource is acquired, and therefore this perspective 
is essential for identifying the implications of each archetype for project performance measures of 
time, cost, and quality. Contract theory, as a theory of incentives, information, and economic 
institutions (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005), highlights the economic implications of the different 
relational arrangements. In concert, the two perspectives provide a conceptual platform to 
identify the task and relational implications of each archetype. Next, we describe the emerging 
typology of five contractual archetypes, demonstrate why they represent a continuum of design 
flexibility, and discuss their cost implications in the context of SDAs. We then build on these 
implications to develop a set of research hypotheses. 
 
Archetype 1: FP contracts without a change provision 
The FP-w/o-change archetype is an arrangement in which the price for project completion is 
predetermined. This characteristic creates inflexibility and increases the threat of holdup or costly 
renegotiation should there be a change in the desired specifications (Corts and Singh, 2004; 
                                                 
1 Although we consider the contractual typology as representing a continuum of design flexibility, the five discrete 
archetypes that comprise the typology do not really provide a continuous range of contracts.  
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Kalnins and Mayer, 2004). Furthermore, this archetype includes no provision for change, i.e., 
there is no structural mechanism in the contract to accommodate changes in the specifications of 
the software product. Because the option of renegotiation is not formally defined, we view this 
archetype as offering the lowest level of design flexibility.  
In software development projects characterized by high design completeness, structured 
software engineering methodologies (e.g., waterfall model of the software development life 
cycle) are most effective. Structured methodologies emphasize "fully elaborated documents as 
completion criteria for early requirements and design phases" (Boehm, 1988, p. 63). The 
complete and detailed specifications reduce the need for communication and coordination with 
external stakeholders and increase the usefulness of control as a mechanism for revealing quality 
problems in the early stages of development. The detailed specifications enable more accurate 
cost estimation and minimize the premium for uncertainty. For this reason and because of the 
intensive use of control, a high level of trust is not warranted (Mayer et al., 1995). Accordingly, 
vendor familiarity becomes less critical, bidding is highly competitive, and the likelihood of 
selecting foreign vendors increases (Iacovou and Nakatsu, 2008). Because of the firmness of the 
price for project completion (fixed without a renegotiation option), the vendor has the incentive 
to reduce costs and shorten the project duration (Gopal et al., 2003).  
 
Archetype 2: FP contracts with a change provision 
The FP-w/-change archetype represents an FP contract that includes a specific clause with 
explicit change management principles and guidelines. Such a clause may describe procedures 
for change requests, for analyzing their impacts, and for renegotiation discussions. Research has 
highlighted the importance of the inclusion or omission of such a clause in a contract (Chen and 
Bharadwaj, 2009; Saunders et al., 1997; Sia et al., 2008). Contingency planning constitutes one 
of the main categories of terms in which contractual safeguards are embedded (Argyres et al., 
2007). In principle, in most contractual arrangements the client is free to raise change requests, 
which the vendor may reject or choose to accept contingent on ensuing changes to the project 
scope, time, or price. However, we distinguish between FP-w/o-change and FP-w/-change 
arrangements because the latter provides a structural mechanism for adaptation. This distinction 
rests on the assumption that, ceteris paribus, a change request is more likely to be accepted when 
a change provision clause has been included in the contract. This assumption implies that FP-w/-
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change arrangements are designed better than FP-w/o-change arrangements to deal with 
adaptation and, therefore, offer a higher level of design flexibility. 
The FP-w/-change archetype, like the FP-w/o-change archetype, requires a high level of 
design completeness and frequently uses structured software engineering methodologies. 
However, the inclusion of a change provision mechanism in the contract loosens the implications 
attributed above to the FP-w/o-change archetype. First, greater familiarity and trust are needed 
because of the higher expectation and likelihood of renegotiations. Second, the price for project 
completion should be higher to reflect the premium for the renegotiation option. Changes 
increase cost volatility, thus affecting the premium for cost risk (Eremenko, 2007). Third, control 
may be less intensive and project duration may be longer in order to facilitate the adaptability 
enabled by the change provision. 
 
Archetype 3: Mixed FP and T&M contracts 
In the Mixed archetype, the product is delivered through a relatively balanced combination of FP 
and T&M arrangements. This archetype combines the strengths of both arrangements – work 
packages with high levels of design completeness can be procured using FP mechanisms, and 
work packages with low levels of design completeness can be procured using T&M mechanisms. 
Hence, the client is able to align, to a limited extent, design flexibility with design uncertainty at 
the work package level rather than at the project level. Because of this higher sensitivity of Mixed 
arrangements to uncertainty, and because they include T&M mechanisms, we consider them as 
superior to FP-w/o-change and FP-w/-change arrangements in terms of design flexibility. 
Mixed arrangements require the integration of work packages with high design 
completeness and work packages with low design completeness within a single project. Lacity 
and Willcocks (1998) define "mixed" outsourcing contracts as combinations of "detailed" 
contracts, in which requirements are fully specified, and "loose" contracts, in which requirements 
are loosely defined. Because uncertainty is high in the early stages of software development and 
decreases in later stages (Boehm et al., 2000), FP arrangements should replace T&M 
arrangements as the project progresses. Accordingly, Banerjee and Duflo (2000) define "mixed" 
software development contracts as contracts in which specifications tend to be written on a T&M 
basis, and the rest of the work (development and testing) tends to be done on an FP basis. In such 
projects, semi-structured software engineering methodologies, such as rapid application 
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development, may prove most effective, because these methodologies advocate the combination 
of structured techniques and prototyping techniques (Martin, 1991). In Mixed contracts, control 
still plays an important role as a consequence of the FP arrangements, and coordination and trust 
play an important role as a consequence of the T&M arrangements. The combination of FP and 
T&M arrangements also leads to risk being shared between vendor and client. Mixed 
arrangements represent an aggregation of several project phases or sub-systems, and thus their 
price is expected to be relatively high.  
  
Archetype 4: T&M contracts with a price cap 
This archetype is a T&M contract that includes a price cap. As with any T&M arrangement, the 
vendor is not limited in the use of resources, but only up to a predetermined maximum price. The 
price cap indicates that the client has performed some evaluation of the main features of the 
software and has evaluated, to some degree, the overall price of these features. In this sense, 
T&M-w/-cap arrangements resemble FP arrangements. The difference between the two lies in the 
fact that in FP arrangements these evaluations are binding, whereas in T&M-w/-cap arrangements 
they represent a general threshold. 
Placing a price cap on a T&M contract represents another approach to combining the 
features of T&M and FP arrangements and to balancing incentives for quality and cost efficiency 
(Kalnins and Mayer, 2004). Using reasoning similar to ours, Kalnins and Mayer (2004) argue that 
the parties may choose to employ a T&M-w/-cap contract when uncertainty is at an intermediate 
level. We agree, but argue that T&M-w/-cap arrangements afford a higher level of design 
flexibility than Mixed and FP arrangements, because they by and large rely on T&M 
mechanisms. However, T&M-w/-cap arrangements afford a lower level of design flexibility than 
T&M-w/o-cap arrangements, because they embed an FP element that increases the vendor's 
motivation to control costs, vulnerability to costly renegotiation, and hence reluctance to accept 
proposed changes. 
The T&M-w/-cap archetype should be employed in projects with low design completeness. 
In such projects, unstructured software engineering methodologies, such as agile software 
development, should be more effective (Austin and Devin, 2009). Agile development is an 
overarching concept used to describe a group of methods designed to reduce the cost of change 
throughout a project (Highsmith and Cockburn, 2001). These methods are characterized by short 
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iterative cycles of development driven by product features, incorporation of rapid feedback and 
change, and continuous integration of code changes into the system under development 
(Cockburn, 2002; Nerur et al., 2005). Because design completeness is low, there is a need for 
more intensive coordination, higher familiarity and trust, and longer duration to allow for 
experimentation and feedback and to accommodate probable specification changes. The existence 
of a price cap reduces the risk of project escalation. The intensity of control is low to facilitate 
change, although the price cap warrants some control. Risk is allocated mainly to the client, but 
the vendor bears some risk because of the price cap. 
 
Archetype 5: T&M contracts without a price cap 
This archetype is a typical T&M contract, in which the price for project completion is not 
constrained. The client reimburses the vendor for its costs plus a predetermined profit. The 
primary benefit of this archetype, relative to an FP contract, is the reduced renegotiation cost 
(Bajari and Tadelis, 2001), which comes at the expense of introducing a moral hazard problem 
(Corts and Singh, 2004). As requirements change in T&M contracts, the vendor is more likely to 
accept changes requested by the client without any need for renegotiating the initial contract 
(Kalnins and Mayer, 2004). Among the archetypes in the proposed typology, this archetype 
offers the best conditions to satisfactorily address situations in which adaptation is needed, 
because the contract places no limitations on the vendor's ability to allocate resources to the 
project. We thus view this archetype as offering the highest level of design flexibility. 
T&M-w/o-cap arrangements are similar to T&M-w/-cap arrangements in many respects: 
both are characterized by low design completeness, use of unstructured software engineering 
methodologies, intensive coordination, low control intensity, and longer duration. However, 
because price is not constrained in T&M-w/o-cap arrangements, project escalation poses a 
significant risk. As risk is borne mainly by the client, high familiarity and trust are very 
important, and, consequently, the likelihood of selecting foreign vendors is low. 
Table 1 summarizes the implications of the five archetypes in the proposed contractual 
typology based on the theoretical perspectives of software engineering and contract theory. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
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Research hypotheses: Design flexibility and cost dimensions 
The five contractual archetypes described in the previous section represent a continuum of design 
flexibility, which is lowest in FP-w/o-change arrangements and increases with each transition 
from one archetype to the next. Previous research has relied on a dichotomous view of 
procurement contracts as either FP or T&M to offer a dichotomous view of their associated costs. 
For instance, Bajari and Tadelis (2001) summarize the "conventional wisdoms" about the 
consequences of procurement contracts (e.g., risk allocation, client administration, flexibility for 
change) in the form of a table with two columns, one describing the consequences of FP contracts 
and the other describing the consequences of T&M contracts. In the preceding section, we 
extended previous research by developing a continuum view of procurement contracts. In this 
section, we further advance the literature by offering a continuum view of the costs associated 
with different contractual archetypes.  
Table 1 shows that moving along the design flexibility continuum, from FP-w/o-change 
arrangements to T&M-w/o-cap arrangements, has implications for key project cost dimensions. 
Moreover, the Table implies that design flexibility is monotonically associated with these cost 
dimensions, so that increasing levels of design flexibility are associated with either increasing or 
decreasing levels of cost dimensions. In the following sections, we analyze the implications 
presented in Table 1 to identify a set of five project cost dimensions – coordination, control, trust, 
duration, and price – and to describe how they are associated with design flexibility. The 
complete research model developed and tested in the following sections is presented in Figure 1. 
[Insert Figure 1 about here] 
 
Coordination 
Coordination is the management of dependencies among activities (Malone and Crowston, 1994), 
and it is central to the literature about procurement, outsourcing, and software engineering 
(Cataldo and Herbsleb, 2013; Dibbern et al., 2008; Gopal et al., 2011; Gulati et al., 2005; 
Herbsleb et al., 2006). Gulati et al. (2005) argue that coordination problems can persist even after 
cooperation is achieved because "cooperation problems are rooted in motivation, whereas 
coordination problems arise due to the cognitive limitations of individuals" (p. 419). 
Coordination is required either when environmental contingencies influence the terms and 
conditions of a transaction (Williamson, 1985), or when reciprocal interdependencies, such as 
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ongoing decision making about task allocation and continuous communication, are needed 
(Gulati et al., 2005). Coordination in software development is achieved when different people 
involved in a common project agree to a common definition of what they are building, share 
information, and mesh their activities (Kraut and Streeter, 1995). Empirical studies have shown 
that coordination is one of the most difficult and pervasive problems in development projects 
(Herbsleb et al., 2006). Coordination breakdowns can occur at different levels, including the team 
level (related to system design and implementation) and the corporate level (related to product 
attributes, schedules, and resources) (Curtis et al., 1988). Such breakdowns in coordination 
negatively affect the outcomes of software projects (Faraj and Sproull, 2000).  
Following these conceptualizations, we define coordination in procurement projects as a 
formal mechanism that enables both the client and the vendor to manage interdependencies 
among activities during the project. Such a mechanism should facilitate access to resources, 
information sharing, problem solving, and decision making. For instance, such a mechanism can 
allow the vendor to access users to get their feedback on partial deliverables, or allow the client 
to access the vendor's development team when design changes are required. Coordination differs 
from control, because the former focuses on managing interdependencies among individuals or 
activities, whereas the latter focuses on improving performance relative to the overall goal 
(Sabherwal, 2003).  
We expect coordination to be more intensive as design flexibility increases. First, 
environmental contingencies are associated with coordination problems (Gulati et al., 2005), and 
research has found that coordination is more difficult in software projects that are uncertain, 
unstable, or involve novel technical problems (Kraut and Streeter, 1995). Therefore, projects with 
high uncertainty, in which T&M contracts are more frequently used, should involve more 
intensive coordination. Second, FP contracts involve considerable coordination in the contract 
negotiation and drafting stage, whereas T&M contracts trade-off ex ante coordination for ex post 
coordination. The detailed specifications in FP contracts demand little coordination during the 
project. Conversely, the ongoing modification of specifications in T&M contracts requires 
substantial coordination beyond the formal contract. These two observations are also valid for the 
specific archetypes in our contractual typology. FP-w/o-change arrangements have the highest 
level of design completeness, and thus coordination is expected to be minimal in these 
arrangements. Because changes are not planned, coordination for change management is also not 
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required. FP-w/-change arrangements are less stable because of the change provision, and they 
require a higher level of coordination to identify opportunities for change and to manage its 
consequences. Similarly, T&M-w/o-cap arrangements require more intensive coordination than 
T&M-w/-cap arrangements as a consequence of the lower design completeness. As design 
completeness diminishes, coordination mechanisms should be institutionalized to allow the 
project to advance successfully. 
Hypothesis 1: Design flexibility is positively associated with coordination. 
 
Control 
Control refers to attempts by one individual or organization to motivate another to act in a 
manner consistent with specific expectations and objectives (Ouchi, 1979). We focus on formal 
outcome control rather than on informal or behavior control, because such control is central to 
legally binding contracts governing procurement projects in general and software development 
projects in particular (Choudhury and Sabherwal, 2003; Gopal and Gosain, 2011; Gregory et al., 
2013; Sabherwal, 1999). Formal control is exercised when targets are prespecified and rewards 
are contingent on the achievement of targets (Eisenhardt, 1985). Outcome control involves the 
definition of specific desired outputs, where the client explicitly defines goals and the vendor is 
rewarded for meeting those goals (Kirsch et al., 2002). The primary mechanism of formal 
outcome control in external software development is the deliverable and payment schedules, 
known as project milestones. Milestones are described as "the bedrock of successful software 
development" (Roditti, 1998, p. 7-21), as they provide a mutually agreed upon sequence of 
activities and results and allow the client to either accept or reject intermediate and final 
deliverables (Roditti, 1998; Sommerville, 2000). Empirical studies have shown a positive 
relationship between control and performance (Bartölke et al., 1982). However, cost-benefit 
considerations may limit the intensity of control, because milestones that are too close together 
may cause the project team to spend much of its time preparing deliverables that are not essential 
for the progress of the project (Sommerville, 2000). Empirical studies of the antecedents of 
control have mostly tied sources of uncertainty to types of control, as in the relation of outcome 
measurability and behavior observability to outcome and behavior controls (Eisenhardt, 1985; 
Henderson and Lee, 1992). 
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It becomes more difficult to define formal outcomes as design uncertainty increases. 
Moreover, the definition of formal outcomes constrains the ability to introduce changes in the 
progress of a project. Hence, the client is less motivated to control formal outcomes as design 
flexibility increases. These two predictions lead to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Design flexibility is negatively associated with control. 
 
Trust 
Trust is the expectation that alleviates the fear that an exchange partner will act opportunistically 
(Bradach and Eccles, 1989). At the organizational level, firms develop close bonds with other 
firms through recurrent interactions that create preferential and stable trading relationships 
(Gulati, 1995). Trust becomes more important as uncertainty increases and as detailed contracts 
and formal controls become more costly (Gefen and Reychav, 2014; Gefen et al., 2008; Oshri et 
al., 2015). FP arrangements are characterized by low design uncertainty, and thus the risks of 
unforeseen contingencies and vendor opportunism are small. FP arrangements are also 
characterized by high design completeness, which facilitates formal control. Consequently, FP 
arrangements are more likely to be used with relatively unfamiliar, less trusted vendors. In 
contrast, T&M arrangements, as well as agile methodologies, are characterized by high design 
uncertainty and low design completeness, and thus the risk of vendor opportunism is considerable 
and formal controls are more difficult to implement. The result is that trust becomes critical 
(McHugh et al., 2012) and T&M arrangements are more likely to be used with trusted vendors. 
We hypothesize that our contractual typology also demonstrates this positive association 
between design flexibility and trust, namely, we suggest that trusted vendors are more likely to be 
contracted as design flexibility increases along the typology. FP-w/-change contracts include a 
change provision that facilitates renegotiation. This provision increases the risk that the vendor 
will take advantage of the client's new needs to opportunistically renegotiate higher prices or 
reduced effort. Thus, we expect higher levels of trust in FP-w/-change arrangements than in FP-
w/o-change arrangements. T&M-w/-cap contracts include a price cap that limits the risk of cost 
escalation. Therefore, we expect lower levels of trust in T&M-w/-cap arrangements than in 
T&M-w/o-cap arrangements. Finally, Mixed arrangements should involve intermediate levels of 
trust because they combine FP (less risky) and T&M (more risky) mechanisms.  
Hypothesis 3: Design flexibility is positively associated with trust. 
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Duration 
Duration is the estimated length of time for the procurement project, namely, it is the expected 
time period for the project at the time the contract is signed. The duration of a project has been 
found to influence outsourcing arrangements (Gefen et al., 2016). In FP arrangements, the 
duration is defined clearly in the contract's binding deliverables schedule. In arrangements that 
include T&M mechanisms, duration is typically estimated and agreed upon by both client and 
vendor, but the estimate is not binding. We expect a positive association between design 
flexibility and duration. First, long-duration projects require more flexible arrangements because 
of the higher likelihood that the business and technological environment will change during the 
project. As a consequence of environmental turbulence, the longer the project is in progress, the 
higher the likelihood that business changes (e.g., mergers and acquisitions, strategic 
reorientation) or technological changes (e.g., emerging architectures and standards) will require 
design modifications in the software being developed. Second, more flexible arrangements 
require a longer duration because time compensates for uncertainty and design incompleteness. 
When uncertainty is high and design completeness is low, more time has to be allocated to the 
project to allow more degrees of freedom in accommodating the probable design adaptations. In 
developing Hypothesis 1, we discussed the positive association between design flexibility and 
coordination. Coordination mechanisms require time, and we expect arrangements with higher 
design flexibility to accommodate the need for more intensive coordination by allowing longer 
duration. FP-w/-change arrangements, for instance, should have longer duration than FP-w/o-
change arrangements because of the time involved in coordinating changes and negotiating their 
implications. T&M arrangements should have longer duration than FP arrangements because of 
the time involved in ongoing coordination regarding the detailed software specification. Such a 
process may require input and approval from multiple stakeholders, which are time-consuming 
activities.    
Hypothesis 4: Design flexibility is positively associated with duration. 
 
Price 
Price is the estimated monetary value of the procurement project at the time the contract is 
signed. The size of a software development project, which is reflected in its price, has a strong 
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influence on the manner in which the project is managed (Sommerville, 2000) and on its 
contracting terms in an outsourcing context (Fink and Lichtenstein, 2014). By definition, the 
predetermined price in FP arrangements is binding. Conversely, the ex ante price in arrangements 
that include T&M mechanisms is based on non-binding estimates of the expenses incurred by the 
vendor. We anticipate a positive association between design flexibility and price. This association 
is largely explained by the inclusion of a premium for uncertainty and design incompleteness in 
the project price. Design adaptations are unlikely in FP-w/o-change arrangements, and therefore 
their price need not include a premium for uncertainty and design incompleteness. A 
renegotiation option is embedded in FP-w/-change arrangements, and their price should be higher 
to reflect a premium for this option. The price of Mixed arrangements should be relatively high, 
not only because of their partial T&M orientation, but also because of the additional effort and 
resources involved in integrating the FP and T&M elements. The price of T&M-w/-cap and 
T&M-w/o-cap arrangements should be high as a consequence of the significant premium for their 
high uncertainty and low design completeness. This premium should be higher for T&M-w/o-cap 
arrangements because of their higher uncertainty, which is reflected in the absence of a price cap. 
Hypothesis 5: Design flexibility is positively associated with price. 
 
Methodology 
This section presents the research methodology by describing the research setting and the process 
of data collection, including the measures used to proxy for the various cost dimensions. The next 
section presents the procedures used to analyze the data and the results we obtained. 
 
Research setting 
The research setting for this study is the financial services industry, which is considered to be 
highly competitive, dynamic, and information intensive. This industry is the largest user of IT in 
the industrial sectors (Zhu et al., 2004) and tends to have the highest IT investment risk (Dewan 
et al., 2007). While almost all industries are currently influenced by digital technology, banking 
is at the forefront of digital competitive pressures (e.g., Fintech), significant regulatory changes, 
and opportunities for new efficiencies (Constâncio, 2016). We collected data on SDAs in a 
leading international bank. The bank, headquartered in Europe, is among the largest in the world. 
It provides retail and commercial banking, wealth management, and investment banking in 
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dozens of countries and has tens of thousands of employees. The bank's IT department employs 
about 3,000 permanent employees and 2,000 contractors. 
The bank's systems are either developed in-house, by internal staff complemented by 
external consultants and programmers, or they are developed through SDAs. The bank contracts 
out system development through about 100 local and international vendors. Its methods of 
managing SDAs are typical of other banks and large institutions. The bank maintains a software 
acquisition process that includes eight main steps: request for proposals (RFP), vendor 
evaluation, vendor selection, negotiation, closure, fulfilment, extension, and cancellation. The 
bank aims at using its standard SDA contracts wherever possible. The standard contract is similar 
to contract forms described in the literature (e.g., Kutten, 1988; Pearson, 1984). This contract is 
about 10 pages in length, excluding appendices for scope and schedule. The contract itself 
includes a definition of its purpose and content, the vendor's obligations, scope changes, 
acceptance testing, warranty and guarantee, expenses and payment terms, training, ownership of 
intellectual property, breach penalty, liability, confidentiality and data protection, and prohibition 
against enticement or employment of bank staff. The appendices describe project scope, 
milestones, payment details, the bank's obligations, and project organization. The standard 
contract also defines actions to be taken if the schedule is not maintained, which include either 
setting a new schedule or the option of canceling the contract. The bank's contracting guidelines 
permit changes to the standard contract within defined limits. 
 
Data collection 
This study continues the recent trend toward the quantitative analysis of contractual provisions in 
actual outsourcing contracts (e.g., Argyres et al., 2007; Chen and Bharadwaj, 2009). Consistent 
with previous research, the unit of analysis in this study is the contract (e.g., Ethiraj et al., 2005; 
Gopal et al., 2003; Gulati, 1995). We collected detailed quantitative data from the bank's contract 
repository. Each record in the repository represented a single contract and included the contract 
number, start and end dates, contract price, vendor name, and an electronic scan of the contract. 
We were given access to all software development contracts signed between January 2000 and 
April 2003 – 424 contracts in total. Due to time constraints, we were able to collect detailed data 
only on a representative sample of 270 contracts, which formed our dataset. 
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We followed a systematic scheme to categorize the contracts into the five archetypes in our 
contractual typology. The distinction between FP and T&M contracts was explicitly stated in the 
contracts. We classified contracts as Mixed when they combined both FP and T&M 
arrangements. Pure FP contracts were classified as either FP-w/-change, if they included a change 
provision (i.e., a specific clause with explicit change management principles and guidelines, 
describing procedures for change requests, for analyzing their impacts, and for renegotiation 
discussions), or FP-w/o-change, if such a provision was not included. Contracts that were pure 
T&M were classified as either T&M-w/-cap, if they included a price cap (i.e., a predetermined 
maximum price), or T&M-w/o-cap, if such a cap was not included. Among the 270 contracts in 
our dataset, there were 42 FP-w/o-change, 139 FP-w/-change, 32 Mixed, 14 T&M-w/-cap, and 43 
T&M-w/o-cap arrangements.  
Cost dimensions were evaluated as follows. Coordination was operationally defined as the 
frequency of routine meetings between client and vendor representatives defined in the contract. 
Coordination was assigned a value of '0' when regular meetings were not defined in the contract, 
a value of '1' when regular monthly meetings were defined, or a value of '2' when regular bi-
weekly or weekly meetings were defined. Control was operationally defined as the intensity of 
milestones specified in the contract. Control intensity was calculated as the sum of the numbers 
of payment, delivery, and project milestones, divided by contract price. Payment milestones were 
taken as those milestones at which a portion of the price was due. Delivery milestones were taken 
as delivery dates at which a work package had to be delivered to the client without a payment. 
Project milestones were neither payment nor delivery mileston s; rather, they represented defined 
end-points in the progress of the project. They could describe certain compulsory meetings, client 
sign-off of specification documents, or the end of internal testing. Trust was operationally defined 
as client-vendor familiarity (Gefen et al., 2008), which was measured with two variables. The 
first variable was vendor experience, which we calculated as the accumulated price of previous 
contracts signed with the same vendor after January 2000 (in all 424 contracts signed during the 
period we studied). The second variable was vendor locality, which was a dichotomous variable 
that indicated whether the vendor was international ('1') or local ('2'). Duration was operationally 
defined as the number of days between the contract's start date and its expected completion date, 
as recorded in the contract repository. This value represented the duration of the project as 
contracted between the bank and the vendor. Price was defined as the total price of the contract 
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in U.S. dollars. The price of each contract was copied as explicitly stated in the contract. This 
value represented the binding price for FP contracts or the estimated price for T&M contracts.  
To control for project size, we used two scope dimensions, which served as proxies for the 
size of the software product being developed. The first dimension was external scope, which was 
operationally defined as the number of external scope documents (e.g., requirements, system 
specifications, and system design documents) referred to in the contract. The second dimension 
was total scope, which was operationally defined as the extent of both internal and external scope 
documents. This dimension could be awarded a value of '0' (no scope documents), '1' (one non-
detailed internal scope document), '2' (1-2 scope documents), '3' (3-4 scope documents), '4' (5-9 
scope documents), or '5' (10 or more scope documents). All measures used in this study were 
objective and involved no subjective judgment. Descriptive statistics are presented in Table 2. 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Results 
We used three statistical methods to test the five hypotheses about the associations between 
design flexibility and cost dimensions – coordination, control, trust (vendor experience and 
vendor locality), duration, and price. First, we used a one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) to 
test for differences among the five contractual archetypes for each cost dimension. The mean 
values of cost dimensions across contractual archetypes and ANOVA results are presented in 
Table 3. The ANOVA results were statistically significant at the 0.001 level (the F value for 
duration was significant at the 0.01 level), indicating that there were significant mean differences 
among contractual archetypes for all cost dimensions. Second, we used a Spearman correlation 
analysis as an initial test of the hypotheses because the design flexibility scale was ordinal. This 
analysis also minimized the effect of outliers. Spearman's rho values, also presented in Table 3, 
were all statistically significant at the 0.001 level. They were all in the hypothesized direction – 
positive for coordination (0.347), vendor experience (0.307), vendor locality (0.349), duration 
(0.259), and price (0.358), and negative for control (-0.297).  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We then repeated these analyses with the two scope dimensions as the dependent variables. 
The results of these analyses are presented in Table 4. The ANOVA results were statistically 
significant at the 0.001 level for both external scope and total scope. However, these effects were 
the consequence of one archetype having significantly higher scope values than other archetypes: 
Page 20 of 38Strategic Outsourcing: an International Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Strategic Outsourcing: an International Journal
21 
scope values were higher in Mixed contracts than in other archetypes. A Spearman correlation 
analysis, which tested whether design flexibility was associated with scope dimensions, showed 
no statistically significant correlation for either external scope (rho = -0.007, p = 0.905) or total 
scope (rho = 0.078, p = 0.199). These results rejected the possibility that design flexibility 
confounded with scope and enhanced the validity of our findings concerning the correlations 
between design flexibility and cost dimensions. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Last, we performed six separate regression analyses to examine the effects of design 
flexibility, external scope, and total scope on each of the six cost dimensions. Because of the 
different types of dependent variables (i.e., cost dimensions), three different regression methods 
were used: (a) four ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression models estimated the effects of 
design flexibility and scope dimensions on control, vendor experience, duration, and price 
(continuous variables); (b) an ordinal regression model estimated the effects of design flexibility 
and scope dimensions on coordination (ordinal variable); and (c) a logistic regression model 
estimated the effects of design flexibility and scope dimensions on vendor locality (binary 
variable). A common approach in previous studies has been to use the log of variables that 
measure duration or monetary value because of their skewed distribution (e.g., Chen and 
Bharadwaj, 2009; Ethiraj et al., 2005). We therefore used the log of vendor experience, duration, 
and price in the OLS models. The results of the regression analyses are presented in Table 5 
(OLS regression models) and Table 6 (ordinal and logistic regression models). The results 
showed that design flexibility had a significant effect in the hypothesized direction in all six 
models – the regression coefficients of design flexibility were -0.043 for control, 0.251 for 
vendor experience, 0.065 for duration, 0.169 for price, 0.565 for coordination, and 0.699 for 
vendor locality. These effects of design flexibility on cost dimensions were all statistically 
significant at the 0.001 level. In contrast to design flexibility, external scope had no significant 
effect in any of the six models, and total scope had a significant effect only on price, with a 
coefficient of 0.189 (p<0.01).2 Taken together, the correlation and regression findings showed 
                                                 
2 To ensure that our findings were not due to the log transformation of vendor experience, duration, and price, we 
reran the OLS models with the original values of these variables. The results were consistent with the findings for the 
log values – the regression coefficients of design flexibility were 1,210,742 for vendor experience (p<0.001), 21.947 
for duration (p<0.01), and 39,364 for price (p = 0.05). The only significant effect of scope dimensions on cost 
dimensions was that of external scope on price, with a coefficient of 61,288 (p<0.001). 
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that design flexibility was associated with all cost dimensions, and that scope dimensions were 
not associated with either design flexibility or cost dimensions (except for the effect of total 
scope on price). Based on these findings, we concluded that all five hypotheses were supported 
by the data collected in this study. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
 
Discussion 
Software development remains a complex task to outsource and, therefore, it continues to be a 
suitable context for analyzing the nuances of flexibility, coordination, control, and trust in formal 
contractual arrangements. In this study, we show that five contractual archetypes have evolved to 
provide a continuum of design flexibility and that moving along this continuum is associated with 
multiple project costs. Our findings shed light on the ability of firms to align flexibility with 
uncertainty at the onset of new projects and on their incentives for doing so. Firms respond to 
design uncertainty by seeking design flexibility. However, the need for design flexibility is 
balanced by the need to minimize project costs. As the variance of uncertainty increases, these 
conflicting needs should drive firms to break away from the prevailing typology of procurement 
contracts as either FP or T&M and move toward a broader set of contractual archetypes.  
The contractual data we collected confirm that the proposed contractual typology does 
indeed exist in practice. While some archetypes are employed more frequently than others – with 
FP-w/-change being the most frequently used (51.5%) and T&M-w/-cap being the least 
frequently used (5.2%) – all five archetypes defined in this study are unambiguously and 
repeatedly detectable in the data. Furthermore, data analysis supports all five hypotheses. It 
shows that higher flexibility is associated with higher coordination, lower control, higher trust 
(vendor experience and locality), longer duration, and higher prices. It also shows that these 
associations cannot be explained by scope differences across the archetypes.  
However, the significant associations between design flexibility and cost dimensions are not 
reflected in every transition from one archetype to another for every cost dimension. While data 
analysis illustrates that costs do increase with increasing design flexibility, we find particular 
instances in which making a transition from an archetype with lower design flexibility to an 
archetype with higher design flexibility does not have the hypothesized effect. This observation is 
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more marked at the high end of the design flexibility continuum. The typology suggests that the 
inclusion of a price cap in a T&M contract should have a limiting effect on project costs. 
However, this hypothesized effect was not found consistently in our data. A plausible explanation 
for this finding is based on the relatively small number of T&M-w/-cap contracts in the data (14 
contracts). Such a number makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions about the cost differences 
between T&M-w/-cap and T&M-w/o-cap contracts. The finding that T&M-w/-cap contracts 
constituted the smallest share of the contracts in the data (5.2%), considerably smaller than that of 
T&M-w/o-cap contracts (15.9%), may imply that when clients opt for T&M contracts, their 
default choice is not to constrain the vendor's flexibility. In contrast, data analysis provides 
stronger support for the hypothesized effects at the low end of the design flexibility continuum. 
Our findings confirm that the inclusion of a change provision in an FP contract is sufficiently 
significant to increase project costs. 
The Mixed archetype exhibits the most unexpected pattern of costs. The typology regards 
this archetype as representing an intermediate level of design flexibility between the two 
relatively inflexible FP archetypes and the two relatively flexible T&M archetypes. An 
assumption underlying the typology is that a design flexibility continuum requires that FP and 
T&M archetypes should not remain mutually exclusive. For a continuum to exist, there should be 
an archetype that combines the different mechanisms into a single arrangement. Accordingly, we 
expected Mixed contracts to be associated with intermediate levels of project costs. The results 
show that the cost pattern of Mixed contracts is somewhat similar to that of the two T&M 
archetypes. Moreover, price is highest in Mixed contracts. We propose two explanations for these 
results. First, it may very well be that Mixed contracts are mo e flexible than we think. The 
ability to mix FP and T&M mechanisms in a variety of combinations may yield flexible 
arrangements that bring together the advantages of both mechanisms. Mixed contracts may 
therefore be both the most flexible and the most costly. Second, Mixed contracts are frequently 
an aggregation of several phases or sub-systems. The upside of this archetype is that it allows 
different levels of design completeness to coexist within a single contract. Its downside lies in the 
additional effort and complexity involved in bridging and integrating the different arrangements. 
The relatively high costs associated with Mixed contracts may be the consequence of this 
additional complexity. This explanation is supported by our findings that both scope dimensions 
are significantly higher in Mixed contracts than in other archetypes.  
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Theoretical contributions 
This study uses the theoretical lenses of contract theory and software engineering to construct and 
test a contractual typology for software development. It therefore contributes to both streams of 
research. The study makes an important contribution to the general literature on procurement 
contracts (Bolton and Dewatripont, 2005; Hart and Holmstrom, 1985), particularly contractual 
arrangements aimed at software development. The contractual typology developed in this study is 
founded on a continuum perception of design uncertainty, completeness, and flexibility, which is 
conceptually distinct from the prevailing dichotomous perception of these concepts. To develop 
this continuum perception, we do not reject the traditional distinction between FP and T&M 
procurement contracts. On the contrary, we rely on this distinction in our proposition that 
archetypal variations of FP and T&M contracts have evolved to provide a continuum of design 
flexibility between the extreme levels of design flexibility characterizing these two dominant 
archetypes. This continuum perception of design flexibility and the ensuing contractual typology 
are novel. They have emerged from a conceptual analysis of the existing literature as well as from 
our extensive familiarity with the contractual mechanisms that are employed to adapt SDAs to 
environmental changes. We consider this perceptual change, which is supported by our empirical 
investigation, to be a valuable contribution to the state of the art. An implication of this 
perceptual change for research is that contractual nuances, such as the inclusion of a change 
provision in a contract, have important consequences for project performance. Researchers 
should pay careful attention to such minor variations when analyzing projects and contracts, as 
their identification and consideration can be helpful in understanding incentives and risk sharing 
in outsourcing arrangements. 
Another important contribution comes from the multidimensional analysis of project costs 
associated with design flexibility. Many previous studies have focused on a single cost dimension 
as the endogenous effect of project characteristics (e.g., Rustagi et al., 2008; Sabherwal, 2003). 
While such an approach has been valuable in unveiling the mechanisms that explain significant 
variance in project performance, it has not advanced our understanding of how multiple cost 
dimensions change in concert. This limitation is addressed in the present study, which explores 
the consequences of moving along the design flexibility continuum in terms of coordination, 
control, trust, duration, and price. The multidimensional approach taken in this study illustrates 
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the trade-off between coordination and control. Hypotheses 1 and 2 describe the associations of 
design flexibility with coordination and control, respectively. These hypotheses and their 
underlying rationales suggest that coordination and control are substitutes in SDAs. Control, 
defined here as an outcome-oriented concept, is a more effective interaction mechanism in 
arrangements with low design uncertainty and high design completeness, i.e., where deliverables 
are easier to define and less susceptible to change. In contrast, coordination, defined here as a 
behavior-oriented concept, is a more effective interaction mechanism in arrangements with high 
design uncertainty and low design completeness, i.e., where deliverables are harder to define and 
more susceptible to change. This important observation about the substitutability of coordination 
and control could not have emerged without a multidimensional approach to the implications of 
design flexibility.   
 
Practical implications 
The present study offers insight into how adaptability is sustained in contracting for software 
development. It is in this insight that the main practical implications of this study lie. Given the 
trend toward the external acquisition of IT resources and the emergence of new business models 
based on these resources, the management of relationships with IT vendors is a major challenge 
facing managers (Applegate et al., 2009; Gewald and Schäfer, 2017). The ability of managers to 
meet this challenge is, in part, contingent upon their ability to design and use contractual 
mechanisms that maximize the alignment between the environmental and structural 
characteristics of their external relationships. However, with the increasing gap between the 
complexity of contemporary business environments and the simplicity of prevailing contractual 
arrangements, it is inevitable that many external relationships will fail to achieve their objectives.  
Firms increasingly find themselves in a situation of having to rely on external arrangements 
to develop software, on the one hand, and having to adapt software resources to frequent 
environmental changes, on the other hand. Those firms that rigidly use a single contractual 
archetype or a narrow set of contractual archetypes may find that the variety in their environment 
exceeds the repertoire of their potential actions. This gap may lead to low design flexibility (if FP 
contracts alone are used), high project costs (if T&M contracts alone are used), or a failure to 
balance design flexibility and project costs (if only FP and T&M contracts are used). The use of a 
broader set of contractual archetypes may allow firms to improve the cost effectiveness of design 
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flexibility. As demonstrated in the present study, such a broader typology does not have to be 
formally defined at the organizational level. It may be based on variations of established 
archetypes, as long as these variations are used consistently to increase the design flexibility of 
constraining arrangements or reduce the design flexibility of costly and risky open-ended 
arrangements, thus creating a continuum of design flexibility. This study shows that including a 
change provision in FP contracts, including a price cap in T&M contracts, and mixing FP and 
T&M mechanisms generate such a broader typology along a continuum of design flexibility. The 
change provision and price cap are important for the construction of a broader typology because 
they address the major risks associated with FP and T&M contracts and thus moderate their 
extreme levels of design flexibility. Employing such a broader typology is a prerequisite to being 
able to align flexibility with uncertainty for each new project. Overall, this study provides insight 
into the contractual mechanisms that can allow clients to have SDAs with different levels of 
flexibility, improving their capability to outsource (Pratap, 2014).  
 
Limitations and future research 
This study has two major limitations, which restrict the generalizability of its findings, yet offer 
avenues for future research. First, the data were collected in a single organization. While the bank 
that granted us access to its contractual data is among the largest in the world, it is fair to assume 
that its outsourcing and contracting practices have been shaped to some extent by the national 
culture (Barthelemy and Geyer, 2001) and the existing organizational culture. This limitation 
offers an interesting direction for future research. The logic of this study suggests that firms in 
rapidly changing environments need to use a broader set of contractual archetypes. This logic 
implies that firms in relatively stable environments may use a narrow set of one or two 
contractual archetypes. Our research setting suggests that the breadth of contractual archetypes 
needs to be higher in industries that are characterized by high levels of information intensity and 
environmental turbulence, such as finance and digital media, but lower in industries that are less 
information intensive and turbulent, such as manufacturing (Yap et al., 2016). Future research 
could employ a multi-site design to explore the relationship between environmental uncertainty 
and dynamics, on the one hand, and the breadth of the contractual typology practiced, on the 
other hand. Second, the data were collected from the bank's contract repository at a single point 
in time. Therefore, the data are correlational in nature. Moreover, some of the cost dimensions, 
Page 26 of 38Strategic Outsourcing: an International Journal
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Strategic Outsourcing: an International Journal
27 
particularly duration and price, are based on project estimates rather than actual project 
performance. The internal validity of the flexibility-cost relationship in SDAs should be further 
demonstrated by additional research, designed to collect both contractual data and project 
performance data. Finally, another direction for future research can be the relation between agile 
software development methodologies (Dingsøyr et al., 2012) and formal contracting. As agile 
methods have become increasingly popular, addressing the issues discussed in this paper in the 
context of these methods can be a promising avenue for research on software development 
outsourcing. 
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Figure 1.   Research Model 
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Table 1.   Implications of Contractual Archetypes Based on Software Engineering and Contract Theory Perspectives 
Archetype Software engineering perspective Contract theory perspective 
FP contracts without a 
change provision  
(FP-w/o-change) 
 High level of design completeness 
 Structured software engineering methodologies 
 Less coordination needed 
 Control maximized to reveal quality problems early 
 Good cost estimation 
 Risk allocated mainly to vendor 
 Competitive bidding 
 High familiarity and trust not needed 
 Relatively high likelihood of selecting foreign vendors 
 Intensive control as a substitute for trust 
 Vendor has incentive to shorten duration 
 Minimal premium for uncertainty 
 
FP contracts with a 
change provision 
(FP-w/-change) 
 High level of design completeness 
 Structured software engineering methodologies 
 
 
 Risk allocated mainly to vendor 
 Somewhat higher familiarity and trust needed because of 
the renegotiation option 
 Price should reflect a premium for the renegotiation option 
 
Mixed FP and T&M 
contracts  
(Mixed) 
 Intermediate level of design completeness 
 Semi-structured software engineering methodologies 
 T&M fits early stages (high uncertainty) and FP fits late 
stages (low uncertainty) 
 Control intensity should be related to the relative scale of 
FP and T&M arrangements 
 
 Risk shared between vendor and client 
 Price expected to be relatively high because Mixed 
contracts are an aggregation of several phases or sub-
systems 
 Familiarity and trust needed because of T&M segments 
T&M contracts with a 
price cap  
(T&M-w/-cap) 
 Low level of design completeness 
 Unstructured software engineering methodologies 
 Price cap limits project escalation 
 High coordination required 
 Lower control intensity 
 Longer duration to allow for experimentation, user 
feedback, and changes 
 
 Risk allocated mainly to client, but vendor bears some risk 
because of the price cap 
 High familiarity and trust needed 
T&M contracts without a 
price cap 
(T&M-w/o-cap) 
 Low level of design completeness 
 Unstructured software engineering methodologies 
 Significant risk of project escalation  
 High coordination needed 
 Control minimized 
 Longer duration 
 
 Risk allocated mainly to client 
 Familiarity and trust very important 
 Relatively low likelihood of selecting foreign vendors 
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Table 2.   Descriptive Statistics (N=270) 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Std. dev. 
Cost dimension 
Coordination – Frequency of routine client-
vendor meetings defined in the contract  
(0 = not defined; 1 = monthly meetings;  
2 = bi-weekly/weekly meetings) 
0 2 0.37 0.71 
Control – Intensity of milestones specified 
in the contract 
(sum of payment, delivery, and project 
milestones, divided by contract price) 
0 2.28 0.098 0.211 
Vendor experience (trust) – Accumulated 
price of previous contracts with the vendor  
(in thousands of U.S. dollars) 
$0K $21,037K $4,426.36K $5,883.42K 
Vendor locality (trust) – Whether the 
vendor was international or local  
(1 = international; 2 = local) 
1 2 1.79 0.41 
Duration – Period of time between the 
contract's start date and its completion date 
(in days) 
3days 880days 189.60days 143.30days 
Price – Total price of the contract  
(in thousands of U.S. dollars) 
$2K $3,490K $315.65K $474.77K 
Scope dimension 
External scope – Number of external scope 
documents referred to in the contract  
(numeric) 
0 33 2.02 3.80 
Total scope – Extent of both internal and 
external scope documents 
(0 = no documents; 1 = one undetailed 
internal document; 2 = 1-2 documents; 3 = 
3-4 documents; 4 = 5-9 documents; 5 = 10 
or more documents) 
0 5 2.43 0.90 
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Table 3.   ANOVA and Correlation Results for Cost Dimensions 
Archetype 
Cost dimension 
Coordination Control 
Vendor 
experience 
(trust) 
Vendor 
locality 
(trust) Duration Price 
(1) FP-w/o-change 0.05 0.246 $406.02K 1.33 129.45days $169.64K 
(2) FP-w/-change 0.24 0.091 $4,594.00K 1.86 182.70days $284.01K 
(3) Mixed 0.94 0.051 $5,754.38K 1.94 230.45days $632.00K 
(4) T&M-w/-cap 0.86 0.038 $3,690.79K 1.93 242.46days $321.36K 
(5) T&M-w/o-cap 0.51 0.026 $7,062.47K 1.86 222.49days $323.61K 
F (ANOVA) 12.441*** 7.845*** 8.380*** 20.999*** 3.590** 4.983*** 
Rho (Spearman) 0.347*** -0.297*** 0.307*** 0.349*** 0.259*** 0.358*** 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; two-tailed p values are reported. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 4.   ANOVA and Correlation Results for 
Scope Dimensions 
Archetype 
Scope dimension 
External  
scope 
Total  
scope 
(1) FP-w/o-change 1.02 2.02 
(2) FP-w/-change 1.91 2.49 
(3) Mixed 5.50 3.25 
(4) T&M-w/-cap 0.79 2.07 
(5) T&M-w/o-cap 1.16 2.16 
F (ANOVA) 9.403*** 12.137*** 
Rho (Spearman) -0.007 0.078 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; two-tailed p values 
are reported.  
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Table 5.   Results of OLS Regression Models 
Variable 
OLS regression model 
Control 
Log (vendor 
experience) Log (duration) Log (price) 
Intercept 0.293*** 
(0.053) 
5.374*** 
(0.232) 
1.847*** 
(0.091) 
4.175*** 
(0.150) 
Design flexibility -0.043*** 
(0.010) 
0.251*** 
(0.043) 
0.065*** 
(0.017) 
0.169*** 
(0.028) 
External scope 0.000 
(0.005) 
0.018 
(0.022) 
0.007 
(0.009) 
0.023 
(0.014) 
Total scope -0.036 
(0.021) 
0.085 
(0.093) 
0.053 
(0.037) 
0.189** 
(0.061) 
F 8.642*** 13.504*** 8.325*** 28.202*** 
R
2
 0.089 0.161 0.091 0.243 
Adjusted R2 0.079 0.149 0.080 0.234 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; two-tailed p values are reported.  
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.   Results of Ordinal and Logistic Regression Models 
Variable 
Ordinal  
regression model 
Logistic  
regression model 
Coordination 
Vendor locality 
(trust) 
Intercept  
 
-1.319 
(0.813) 
Design flexibility 0.565*** 
(0.116) 
0.699*** 
(0.171) 
External scope 0.114 
(0.073) 
0.396 
(0.222) 
Total scope 0.351 
(0.283) 
0.273 
(0.405) 
χ
2(3) 46.318*** 42.492*** 
Log likelihood -88.353 -116.589 
Pseudo R2 (Nagelkerke) 0.209 0.228 
Note. Estimated coefficients are shown with standard errors in parentheses. 
* p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001; two-tailed p values are reported. 
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